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1. Introduction 
1.1 Evolution of performance measurement system in health care organizations  
While cost control has been a significant concern in public health care, stakeholders 
increasingly strive for a more balanced approach in assessing performance delivered by the 
health care service providers. This movement has been driven by health care organizations 
in the developed nations over the past two decades. For instance, in reviewing performance 
measurement and management in public health services of UK and Sweden, Ballentine et al. 
(1998) studied their performance measurement systems under a period of reform for 
market-based competition and discussed the challenges to striking the balance between cost 
control in the back office and delivery of quality service at the front. Moreover, Radnor and 
Lovell (2003) unveiled cases of balanced scorecard implementation in NHS of the UK that 
provided significant benefits for meeting national targets for better transparency, clarity and 
accountability for the stakeholders, including the patients and public in general. Their study 
suggests an effective use of a performance measurement system to enable focus on 
measuring long-term qualitative targets whereas the traditional financial reporting system 
could be biased towards short-term measures.  
With implementation of a performance measurement system, healthcare practitioners are 
driven to make improvement on their accountability to stakeholders. An effective 
performance measurement system is vital for a healthcare organization to deliver cost-
effective and quality services (Moullin, 2004). However, the overemphasis on the 
measurement of cost could have a significant effect on the delivery of performance by a 
hospital. Studying the hospital cost benchmarking introduced in National Reference Costing 
Exercise (NRCE), Llewellyn and Northcott (2005) argued that such increasing reliance on 
hospital cost benchmarking is promoting ‘‘averageness’’ among the hospital making the 
“average hospitals” cheaper to run and easier to control than the highly differentiated ones. 
While these hospitals might perform well on certain measures of service improvement in 
efficiency, they were transformed to comply closely with the “cost accounting average”. All 
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in all, these prior studies revealed the imperative of striving for a balanced performance 
measurement system that embraces delivery of quality services with efficiency.  
2. Improving the utilization of health care resources 
2.1 Efficiency in using health care resources 
Efficiency in the utilization of health care resources is considered to be an important issue 
not only to developed countries but also to developing economies. With reference to the 
report by WHO (2010), there could be trillion dollars of wastage in health care spending 
due to various forms of human related inefficiency, such as misallocation, 
mismanagement and fragmented administration. It is recommended that countries should 
attempt to improve the efficiency of their existing health systems so that they can release 
resources to cover services to people in need. Improvement in efficiency could be 
achieved through dealing with the incentive issues inherent in the health financing system 
as to how services are purchased and providers paid. As noted by WHO (2010), “All 
countries can look to improve efficiency by taking a more strategic approach when providing or 
buying health services, e.g. decide which services to purchase based on information on the health 
needs of the population and link payments to providers on their performance and to information on 
service costs, quality and impact.” 
2.2 Potential slack in health care organizations 
The concept of budgetary slack has been utilized in the prior studies to explain managerial 
behavioural issues among profitable organizations. However, such managerial accounting 
concept is also considered relevant to health care organizations that are non-profit in nature 
with reliance on public funding. For instance, it was documented in a prior management 
study that slack could enable innovation and improvement in performance and quality 
among organizations (Bourgeois, 1981). On the other hand, excess slack could cause 
unnecessary empire building and demote performance in delivery of services to the end 
users as referenced to agency theory (Tan and Peng, 2003). For healthcare organizations, a 
prior study further suggests simultaneous improvement in productivity and quality might 
not be possible even when slack exists (Miller and Adam, 1995). Although slack could 
enhance efficiency, such resources might not necessarily help improve responses to 
externalities, such as quality of customer service (Cheng and Kesner, 1997). 
2.3 Optimizing the use of health care resources through performance monitoring 
Goddard et al. (2000) examined the myopia that could take place within a healthcare 
organization due to the adoption of indicators that focused heavily on cost control and were 
short-term in nature. The study extended that such dysfunctional consequences of cost 
emphasis would not be optimal for quality. It was also pointed out by Van der Stede (2000) 
about the relationship between budgetary slack creation and managerial short-term 
orientation on achieving financial targets. With respect to behavioural issues in managing 
resources, it was examined in another study that incentives are critical to the success of a 
performance measurement system (Courty and Marschke, 2003). Without an effective 
performance measurement and control to deal with concerns of the stakeholders, healthcare 
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service provider would have a higher chance of encountering moral hazard in dealing with 
slack resources (Daniel et al., 2007).  
Given the potential inadequacy of resource utilization, resource optimization needs to be 
considered as an important objective for health care organizations. On one hand a health 
care organization needs to contain costs while on the other to deliver proper quality services 
to the end users. Slack resources could be utilized to enhance quality delivery beyond a 
short timeframe but could also be treated a “buffer” for achieving a certain planned target.  
2.4 Performance of health care systems in developing economies 
Performance of a health care system could be driven by the emphasis what it aims to 
measure and monitor. While the developed nations have spent efforts to broaden their 
measurement of quality, constraint of resources remains as an area of concern. In 
developing economies of Asia, their rapid economic developments could have provided 
them with additional resources allocated to their health care systems. For instance, despite 
China’s rapid economic development in the past two decades, the country’s expenditures in 
public health have remained relatively low in comparison with the developed nations. 
WHO in fact ranked China's health system as 144th out of 190 countries in areas of quality 
and access, among other developing nations in 2000. In a prior study, it was pointed out that 
China’s health care reform placed emphasis on the utilization of the social medical 
insurance system in delivery of health care solutions to her citizens; however, its 
effectiveness has remained debatable (Lee et al., 2007). As shown Figure 1, the mechanism 
within such a social medical insurance system focuses on procedural compliance with the 
health care service providers as well as the financial sustainability of the health system. 
There appears to be extraneous emphasis on quality through a performance measurement 
system over the service providers (Lee et al., 2007).  
 
Fig. 1. Resource allocation mechanism (Lee et al. 2007) 
Nevertheless, quality performance remains varied in terms of patient satisfaction and 
outcomes among other developing economies in Asia. In particular, Singapore was ranked 
6th in the World Health Organization's ranking of the world's health systems in the year 
2000 in terms of overall performance. Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China 
(HKSAR) has been ranked as one of the healthiest places in the world reference to life 
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expectancy at birth. The outstanding performance in these two health systems is worth 
better understanding and a brief review is provided in the following section. The balance 
between their financial and social sustainability is discussed. 
3. Experience of HKSAR and Singapore 
3.1 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) 
The Department of Health is HKSAR’s agency to execute health care policies and aims to 
safeguard the health of the community through promotive, preventive, curative and 
rehabilitative services. In 1991, the government transformed its portfolio of public hospitals 
into a statutory corporation, the Hospital Authority (HA). The reform denoted an attempt to 
implement a new management structure for public hospitals and shift the responsibility of 
operating and managing public hospitals from government bureaucracy to the newly 
established entity (Cheung, 2002). Major reform measures taken by the HA during the early 
stage include the organizational restructuring of public hospital systems at both the 
hospital, region and corporate level with a general management focus; extensive 
development of information technology and systems; management training and 
development for staff; the institutionalization of citizens’ participation in the management of 
public hospitals at hospital, regional and corporate levels (Yuen 1991, Yuen 1994, and Yuen 
and Lieu, 2004).  
By 2003, the government further assigned HA with management responsibility of all of the 
government’s primary care general outpatient clinics, which are formerly run by the 
Department of Health. In assuming responsibility of the clinics, the HA also assumed 
responsibility for the health of the entire population (Caulfield and Liu, 2006). Under a 
unified corporate governance structure, HA currently manages 41 hospitals/institutions, 48 
Specialist Out-patient Clinics (SOPCs) and 74 General Out-patient Clinics (GOPCs), which 
are organized into seven regional clusters. 
Through this delegation of public health services to HA, the delivery of patient care has 
been modelled on a cross-functional team approach. Improvement has been observed in the 
quality of care in public hospital; however, spending has gone up considerably as well. The 
nature of the mechanisms for accountability for HA and the resulting incentives continued 
to be mainly driven by the assessment of government officials. HKSAR’s Health, Welfare 
and Food Bureau is responsible for a wide range of health related policy matters, including 
review of health care delivery and financing systems, development of primary care services, 
prevention of communicable and non-communicable diseases, as well as provision of 
hospital services (Yuen and Lieu, 2004).  
Direct public funding is provided through an annual subvention mechanism and budgetary 
control and continues to be the major source of funding for in-patient services. Such funding 
is however not driven completely by the actual occurrence of services. HA has been 
receiving its budget directly from the government and serving but also taking the roles of 
both purchaser and supplier of health services. The dual role of the HA would cause 
implications about patients’ rights and its accountability to the patients. Incentives for 
performance of the HA were not linked to market exposure (Yip and Hsiao, 2003). As 
money does not follow patients, there is limited incentive for better service or competition 
(Yuen & Lieu, 2004). 
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Although it was expected that the quality of care in public hospital would be improved 
further after the establishment of the HA, a closer inspection of available evidence revealed 
that while the physical environment and medical facilities of public hospitals were generally 
acceptable patients were dissatisfied with the waiting and queuing time in public hospital 
and clinics.1 Previous study by Yuen (2004) also indicated that there remained ample room 
for improvement regarding the quality of care and the attitude of staff in public hospitals. 
For instance, it was observed that the corporate disclosures by HA revealed that its 
performance indicators had been focused on the financial aspects of performance with 
relatively less on the quality ones (Yuen and Ng, 2009). While there is alleged cost efficiency 
in HKSAR’s health care system, the concern about overall quality remains. 
In recent years, HKSAR has introduced mechanisms to enhance the resource allocation of 
funding to its health care system through a performance-driven approach.2 It was 
announced by HA’s Chief Executive, Shane Solomon, towards end of 2008 that a new 
internal resource allocation system would be used to renew HA’s internal budget allocation 
system for improved transparency and fairness. The new funding model called “Pay-for-
Performance” would link resources with workload while rewarding quality and providing 
incentive for efficiency. Resource allocation would be driven by a case-mix approach to 
evaluate the number and complexity of patients treated.  
3.2 Singapore  
Health care services in Singapore are largely the responsibility of Singapore’s Ministry of 
Health. Singapore has developed a universal healthcare system with emphasis on 
affordability achieved through compulsory savings and price controls as well as a strong 
public-private partnership. In fact, its private sector currently plays a significant role in 
delivery of health care services. Besides its high ranking by the World Health Organization 
in 2000 for its overall balanced performance, Singapore is among the countries that have 
attained the lowest infant mortality rate in the world and high life expectancies from birth. 
Public hospitals in Singapore went through a plan of restructure in the 1990s and were re-
organized as government-owned corporations rather than as typical public hospitals in 
other countries. Unlike the HKSAR’s mechanism to form a single, mega health care service 
organization, Singapore established two major healthcare groups that oversees the 
operations of restructured hospital: SingHealth and the National Healthcare Group (NHG). 
In addition, the health care system contains a smaller group affiliated with the National 
University of Singapore called the National University Health System (NUHS).3  
With respect to health care financing, Singapore has adopted a system that makes use of a 
combination of compulsory savings from payroll deductions, a nationalized catastrophic 
                                                 
1 The increase in demand was found not accompanied by increases in resources under an inflexible cost 
structure. Such constraint in resources can be reflected in the waiting time of public hospital services is 
long in Hong Kong. The average waiting time for urgent cases to get a first appointment at the Special 
Out-Patient Clinic (SOPC) was 92 days while 101 days for non-urgent cases. The waiting time of SOPC 
had been on an increasing trend started from 1999 onwards. The waiting time then varied from 5 to 30 
weeks (Soloman, 2006). It was considered relatively long when compared to the OECD average of 2 to 3 
months (Hurst and Siciliani, 2003).  
2 Source: http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200811/19/P200811190266.htm  
3 Source: http://www.moh.gov.sg/content/moh_web/home.html  
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health insurance plan and government subsidies. The deductions from payroll are shared 
jointly by both employers and employees. To obtain further protection, Singaporeans 
would purchase supplemental private health insurance on services not covered by the 
government's schemes. Moreover, the government would actively regulate the supply and 
prices of healthcare services in the country in order to monitor the associated costs 
carefully. Singapore has developed a co-financing scheme for its health care system that 
shares the overall burden and financial risk. Its dynamic regulations over the supply and 
prices have also made its comprehensive system fairly unique when compared with other 
countries. For example, people are empowered to seek a suitable service provider from 
the private sector but required to pay a share of health care service charge regardless of 
the level of subsidy.  
To complement its health care financing approach, Singapore has recognized the importance 
of reducing information asymmetry between the end users and the health care service 
providers on quality performance. As advocated by Lim (2005), “Singapore’s regulatory 
framework should not merely consist of 2 parties, namely the regulator (MOH) and the regulated 
(public and private providers). It should ideally be tripartite, in which empowered and well-informed 
consumers play their rightful role in selecting health care providers on the basis of price and quality of 
care provided. Information asymmetry would not be an insurmountable barrier once the full power of 
information technology plus the role of the media is brought to bear.” Such an advocated 
regulatory framework by Lim (2005) is provided in Figure 2. 
 
Fig. 2. A tripartite regulatory framework (Lim, 2005) 
4. Concluding remarks 
As revealed in prior studies, slack could be created when there is rigid budgetary control 
system and there are certain consequences on the performance delivered by an organization 
(Bourgeois, 1981; Miller and Adam, 1995; Van der Stede, 2000). A transparent performance 
measurement system is critical for the stakeholders to monitor quality performance. As a 
government funded organization, HA of Hong Kong operates under a rather rigid 
budgetary control culture which reinforces accountability for its cost efficiency and quality 
of services. However, its mega organizational structure makes monitoring quality 
performance of its numerous health care entities a challenge and quality transparency with 
the end-users a difficulty. 
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Subsequent to HA’s incorporation, the organization has been under pressure to strengthen 
cost efficiency as a publicly funded operation. While cost containment as an important 
objective that HA has strived to achieve, there is no indication that quality performance 
expected by the end users has been met. In fact, HA has voluntarily disclosed more cost-
related performance indicators than those concerning quality-related, non-financial 
information. Similar experience is reflected by Daniel et al. (2007) that, lacking an effective 
performance measurement and control to deal with concerns of the stakeholders, a 
healthcare service provider could create moral hazard in dealing with slack resources. As a 
consequence, a phenomenon of “average hospital” that focuses on the cost control might 
emerge within HA as reflected in a prior study by Llewellyn and Northcott (2005). Hong 
Kong SAR appears to retain an embedded cost optimization system that operates to 
maintain acceptable service levels. However, quality performance remains a key concern 
while there is continuous emphasis on cost containment as the population expands. While 
prior literatures suggest that not all additional resources could improve performance, an 
organization needs incentives to better utilize its slack resources towards performance 
improvement. HA’s recently introduced “Pay-for-Performance” incentives with increasing 
measurement of performance would enable its system to induce optimal use of resources 
towards pre-determined quality performance targets. 
In the case of Singapore, the country proceeds with an increasingly transparent performance 
measurement system that not only monitors cost efficiency but also quality performance as a 
key concern among the stakeholders. Performance measurement system plays a critical role 
in enhancing stakeholders’ decision for purchasing services as well as in facilitating the 
development of a public-private partnership for health care financing that makes the overall 
health system a relatively more self-sustainable one. Table 1 provides a brief comparison  
 
Fig. 3. Enhanced resource allocation mechanism through a balanced performance 
measurement system (Lee et al. 2007) 
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 Health care financing
Performance 
measurement system 
Quality improvement 
initiatives 
Hong Kong SAR - Jointly but 
separately by 
public and 
private sectors 
- Reliance on a 
subvention 
budgetary system 
to monitor cost 
efficiency 
- Advocating self-
insured schemes 
- Subvention 
budgetary control 
measures with 
disclosures at the 
corporate level 
- Emphasis on cost 
efficiency with 
selected qualitative 
data through a high-
level corporate 
disclosures - limited 
linkage to corporate 
governance 
- Introducing 
performance-
based incentives  
- External 
accreditation on 
hospitals4 
Singapore - Well-designed 
public-private 
partnership 
- Multiple sources 
of funding  
- Complementary 
roles and 
specializations of 
participants, with 
active regulatory 
measures by 
government 
- Extensive disclosures 
and performance 
indicators on a range 
of quality 
performance by 
cluster companies5  
- Focusing on both 
cost efficiency and 
quality performance 
- Commitments 
through corporate 
governance 
- Further focus on 
quality 
performance and 
pertinent 
indicators 
- Positioned as the 
regional hub for 
health care 
services 
Table 1. Comparison between HKSAR and Singapore in Health Care Financing and 
Performance Measurement System 
between HKSAR and Singapore with respect to health care financing and performance 
measurement system. It also remarks their initiatives on quality improvement.  
In conclusions, this article explores the interplay between resource management for health 
care service and a balanced performance measurement system within a health care system. 
Two outstanding health care systems in Asia are reviewed briefly. It argues that an effective 
health care financing system that empowers the end users to allow financial resources could 
be enhanced by a transparent performance measurement system that provides relevant 
information about quality performance of a health care service provider and thereby 
                                                 
4 HA, with the support and collaboration from the Department of Health and Private Hospitals 
Association in Hong Kong, launched the "Pilot Scheme of Hospital Accreditation" in May 2009 with the 
following objectives: (i) Establish infrastructure of accreditation, including Standards and Surveyors, (ii) 
Assess the feasibility of implementing accreditation program, (iii) Enhance public-private collaboration 
and; (iv) Evaluate and recommend on future model of accreditation in Hong Kong. 
5 For instance, SingHealth discloses clinical outcomes on various measures to track the quality of clinical 
services provided at its institutions. 
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reduces information symmetry among the stakeholders (see Figure 3). Second, Singapore 
has developed a relatively smaller but apparently more optimal corporate structure for her 
clusters of health care service providers. Such an optimal size facilitates an effective 
corporate governance function of monitoring performance and accountability for quality 
when integrated with a balanced performance measurement system.6 This experience is 
relevant to other public health care systems that aim to become more effective and 
responsive to deliver quality health care services. 
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